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BANKS AND THEIR CUSTOMERS UNDER THE
REVISIONS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ARTICLES 3 AND 4: ALLOCATION
OF LOSSES RESULTING FROM
FORGED DRAWERS' SIGNATURES
Nan S. Ellis*
Steven B. Dow**
I. INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code)
address how losses resulting from forged drawers' signatures on checks
and other items should be allocated.' The UCC's loss allocation scheme
for forged drawers' signatures affects two different relationships. The
first relationship is between the payor bank2 and its checking account
customer.3 Generally, if the bank pays a check or other item bearing a
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola College of Maryland; B.A., 1974, J.D., 1977, Ohio
State University.
** Associate Professor of Business Law, Michigan State University; B.L.S., 1973, Bowl-
ing Green State University; J.D., 1978, Ohio State University; M.A., 1989, University of
Michigan.
1. U.C.C. arts. 3-4 (1990). Articles 3 and 4 govern negotiable instruments, check collec-
tions and certain banking practices. For a table listing states that have adopted the UCC and
the state codifications, see UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, 1 U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1989).
2. A "bank" is "any person engaged in the business of banking." U.C.C. § 1-201(4)
(1990). A "payor bank" is "a bank that is the drawee of a draft." Id. § 4-105(3). The
"drawee" is the "person ordered in a draft to make payment." Id. § 4-104(a)(8). For a discus-
sion of the problematic nature of these definitions, see Steven B. Dow, Determining Bank Sta-
tus in Article Four Check Collections, 49 U. Pri. L. REv. 43, 50-60 (1987); see also ROBERT
BRAUCHER & ROBERT A. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 64
(1977) (discussing these definitions with examples of presentment and payment of checks);
DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS & MATERIALS ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 2-3 (2d ed.
1988) (giving examples using these terms).
3. The "customer" is "a person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has
agreed to collect items." U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(5) (1990). Typically this is the person who signs
the check or other item as drawer. A check can, however, be signed by a customer's agent. Id.
§ 3-402; see BRAUCHER & RIEGERT, supra note 2, at 64; WHALEY, supra note 2, at 2-3.
A "check" is defined as a "draft... payable on demand and drawn on a bank." U.C.C.
§ 3-104(f)(i). A "draft" is defined both as an instrument that is an order, id. § 3-104(e), and
"an item... that is an order," id. § 4-104(a)(7). An "instrument" is defined as "an uncondi-
tional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money." Id. § 3-104(a), (b). An "item" is
defined as "an instrument or a promise or order to pay money handled by a bank for collection
or payment." Id. § 4-104(a). The "payee" is the person to whom the drawer ordered the
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forged drawer's signature, it must recredit its customer's account for the
check amount unless the bank establishes a defense.4 The second rela-
tionship concerns loss allocation between banks ("interbank"), but this
arises only if the payor bank either voluntarily or involuntarily recredits
its customer's account.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALl) recently revised Arti-
cle 3 of the Code and correspondingly amended Articles 1 and 4.5 These
Code revisions (RUCC) have already been adopted in nine states and are
presently being considered by the legislatures in twelve other states, in-
cluding New York and California.6 This Article argues that the changes
under the RUCC relating to loss allocation between the payor bank and
drawee (payor bank) to pay. BRAUCHER & RIEGERT, supra note 2, at 63; WHALEY, supra
note 2, at 2-3. A drawer is "a person who signs or is identified in a draft as a person ordering
payment." U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(3). The collection process involves the transmittal of the order
to the drawee (or payor bank) so that the order may be carried out. See id. § 4-204.
4. For a discussion of the negligence defense, see infra notes 22-32 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the basis of the customer's action against the bank to recredit, see
infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
5. U.C.C. arts. 1, 3, 4 (1990). The Code revisions attempt to delineate the effect of final
payment on the payor bank's restitutionary rights, as well as to accommodate electronic check
processing methods. See Robert G. Ballen et al., Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Col-
lections, and Other Payment Systems, 45 Bus. LAW. 2341 (1990). See generally id. at 2355-57
(discussing project to revise Article 4); Robert G. Ballen et al., Commercial Paper, Bank De-
posits and Collections, and Other Payment Systems, 44 Bus. LAw. 1515, 1538-51 (1989) (dis-
cussing project to revise Articles 3 and 4); Fred H. Miller & William B. Davenport,
Introduction to the Special Issue on the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Bus. LAw. 1389 (1990)
(discussing related revision projects).
6. This Article generally distinguishes between the former UCC and the revised UCC,
and between current law and proposed law. Although the revised UCC (RUCC) has been
adopted by nine states and is, therefore, current law in these states, the former UCC continues
to be the current law in most states. Since this Article addresses itself to the 41 states that have
not adopted the RUCC, the Article refers to the RUCC as "proposed" law and to the former
UCC as "current" law. Although the Uniform Commercial Code, as drafted by the NCCUSL
and the ALI, contains the revisions to Article 3 and the corresponding amendments to Articles
1 and 4, this Article refers to the former Code as the UCC and to the revised Code as the
RUCC.
As of the date of this publication, the nine states that have adopted the RUCC include
Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma and
Wyoming. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-101 to -208, 4-3-101 to -605, 4-4-101 to -504 (Michie
Supp. 1991); Act effective Oct. 1, 1991, P.A. No. 91-304, 1991 Conn. Legis. Serv. 602-58
(West); Act effective Jan. 1, 1992, ch. 490 (Hawaii); Act effective Feb. 1, 1992, ch. 296 (Kan-
sas); Act approved Apr. 10, 1991, ch. 410 (Montana); Act operative Jan. 1, 1992, L.B. 161
(Nebraska); Act effective Jul. 1, 1993, ch. 448 (North Dakota); Act effective Jan. 1, 1992, ch.
117, 1991 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 370 (West); WYO. STAT. §§ 34.1-3-101 to -905 (1991).
The RUCC has been introduced to the legislatures of the following twelve states: Ari-
zona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah,
Vermont, Washington and West Virginia. Telephone interview with Katie Robinson, Legisla-
tive Assistant, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Sept. 5, 1991).
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its checking account customer will make it much more likely than under
the UCC that the losses resulting from forged drawers' signatures will
fall on the customer. As a result, the payor bank will rarely have any
need to recover payment from other banks, making the RUCC changes
in interbank loss allocation rules relatively unimportant.
This Article focuses on forged drawers' signatures under the RUCC
and how the proposed changes affect loss allocation between the payor
bank and its checking account customer. The Article will (1) briefly re-
view the law under the UCC relating to forged drawers' signatures;7
(2) identify the relevant changes within the RUCC;8 and (3) discuss and
evaluate these changes.9 The Article concludes that the changes are un-
sound and that state legislatures should not adopt them. 10 The Article
proposes that a two-tier loss allocation scheme is a preferable alternative
to both the UCC and the RUCC, and that by adopting this scheme,
states can both increase incentives to minimize forgery losses and imple-
ment an equitable system for allocating losses."
II. ALLOCATION OF LOSSES UNDER THE UCC
A. General Rule
The UCC rule currently used by most states regarding forged draw-
ers' signatures provides that if the payor bank pays the item, it bears the
loss.' 2 This rule applies both in disputes between the payor bank and its
customer,'3 and in disputes between the payor bank and prior collecting
banks.'4 The RUCC, however, changes this loss allocation scheme by
making it easier for the payor bank to shift the loss to its customer.
Under the UCC, if the payor bank pays'5 a forged item and charges its
7. See infra notes 12-40 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 57-93 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
12. This rule stems from several UCC sections including § 3-418 (payment final in favor of
a holder in due course), § 4-302 (payor bank accountable), § 3-417 and § 4-207 (warranties)
and § 4-401 (properly payable); see infra notes 17, 38 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 797,
831, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883, 905-06 (1978). See infra note 22 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of available defenses.
14. Northern Trust Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 784 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (final payment rule bars restitution, negligence, conversion and warranty actions by
payor in cases of forged drawers' signatures); see infra note 38.
15. The term "pays" is used here to connote final payment. Methods of paying an item are
governed by U.C.C. § 4-213. U.C.C. § 4-213 (1989) (superseded by § 4-215 (1990)). See
Steven B. Dow & Nan S. Ellis, The Payor Bank's Right to Recover Mistaken Payments: Sur-
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customer's account, the customer can demand that the payor bank
recredit his or her account for the amount of the item.1 This demand is
based upon the fact that the payor bank may only charge its customer's
account for an item which is properly payable. 7 Although the UCC
does not say so directly," a check bearing a forged drawer's signature is
not properly payable.19 Consequently, the payor bank must recredit its
vival of Common Law Restitution Under Proposed Revisions to Uniform Commercial Code Arti-
cles 3 and 4, 65 IND. L.J. 779, 802-04 (1990), for a discussion of the final payment concept.
16. The customer typically becomes aware of the forgery upon receipt of the bank state-
ment revealing payment of the unauthorized check. See, eg., Dean v. Centerre Bank, 684
S.W.2d 373, 374-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772
S.W.2d 183, 188 (Trex. Ct. App. 1989). The customer might also become aware of the forgery
when the payment of a forged item has depleted the funds in the customer's account, resulting
in the payor bank dishonoring the customer's check for insufficient funds.
17. U.C.C. § 4-401(1) states: "As against its customer, a bank may charge against his
account any item which is otherwise properly payable from that account. .. ." U.C.C. § 4-
401(1) (1989) (superseded by § 4-401(a) (1990)). Thus, by implication the payor bank may not
charge its customer's account unless the item is properly payable. See, e.g., National Credit
Union Admin. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 771 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting general rule
that "bank is liable for paying an item with a missing indorsement because the item is not
'properly payable' "); Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. Girard Bank, 522 F. Supp. 414, 418 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (bank deemed to have used own money in honoring forged check); Danning v. Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 151 Cal. App. 3d 961, 969, 199 Cal. Rptr. 163, 168 (1984)
(stating that "a check with an unauthorized signature is not properly payable"), overruled on
other grounds by Arceneaux v. Arceneaux, 51 Cal. 3d 1130, 275 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1990); Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 797, 805 n.7, 149 Cal. Rptr.
883, 889 n.7 (1978) ("[B]ank is not entitled to debit depositor's accounts upon payments not
made by his [or her] order or direction."); Isaac v. American Heritage Bank & Trust Co., 675
P.2d 742, 744 (Colo. 1984) (bank may not charge against account item not properly payable);
Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 304 A.2d 838, 842-43 (Md. 1973) (UCC codifies underlying
contract implied between bank and its customer that bank will charge any item properly paya-
ble against depositor's account only on order of depositor or depositor's agent); North Caro-
lina Nat'l Bank v. Hammond, 260 S.E.2d 617, 622 n.1 (N.C. 1979) ("[D]rawee bank cannot
debit its drawer customer's account for an improperly paid item... of which payments of a
forged check is presumably one species."); Bank of the West v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 548 P.2d
563, 566 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) ("A drawee bank may not debit a drawer's account after
paying a check with a forged payee's indorsement.").
18. U.C.C. § 4-104(i) (1989) (subsection withdrawn 1990) (" '[P]roperly payable' includes
the availability of funds for payment at the time of decision to pay or dishonor.").
19. Under the UCC, "Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the
person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it." Id. § 3-
404(1) (superseded by U.C.C. § 3-403 (1990)). Inasmuch as the customer in the case of a
forged drawer's signature has not directed the payor bank to pay the item and to charge his
account, courts and commentators agree that the item is not "properly payable." National
Credit Union Admin., 771 F.2d at 157; Cumis Ins. Socy, 522 F. Supp. at 418; Danning, 151
Cal. App. 3d at 969, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 168; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 804-05
nn.5 & 7, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 889 nn.5 & 7; BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS,
COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS § 6.2 (rev. ed. 1981); Dow, supra note 2, at 77 n.221;
Carolyn Edwards, Recovery of Final Payments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 OHIO
N.U. L. REv. 341, 342 (1979); John D. O'Malley, The Code and Double Forgeries, 19 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 36, 37 (1967); John D. Colombo, Comment, Commercial Paper and Forgery:
November 1991] FORGED DRAWERS' SIGNATURES
customer's account for the amount of the item2 ° unless the bank can as-
sert a defense.
B. Payor Bank's Defenses
The payor bank can assert several defenses in response to its cus-
tomer's demand for recredit.2 ' This Article addresses customer
negligence.
1. Customer negligence
Customer negligence is the payor bank's defense most affected by
the changes to the UCC.22 Under present law in most jurisdictions, the
customer is precluded from asserting that the check was unauthorized if
his or her negligence "substantially contribute[d]" to the forgery.23
Neither the UCC nor its comments, however, clarify the intended mean-
ing of "substantially contributes." While the phrase is obviously meant
to impose a causation requirement, it is unclear whether such a require-
ment encompasses a proximate cause test and, if so, which proximate
cause test.24 The extent to which the "substantially contributes" clause
Broader Liabilityfor Banks?, 1980 U. ILL. L. REv. 813, 819; Michae J. Morse, Note, Uniform
Commercial Code-Articles 3 and 4-Bank Required to Disburse Funds After Final Payment,
64 MARQ. L. REv. 408, 410 (1980).
20. G & R Corp. v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Issac v. American Heritage Bank & Trust Co., 675 P.2d 742, 744 (Colo. 1984), aff'g 635 P.2d
1296 (1981) (stating customer's right to demand that bank recredit account may be implied
from § 4-401). Under UCC §§ 3-406 and 4-406, if the customer is negligent and precluded
from asserting the forgery, the item is technically properly payable. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989); id.
§ 4-406 (amended 1990); see Fireman's Fund Ins Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 804 n.5, 149 Cal.
Rptr. at 889 n.5 (1978).
21. See infra note 22.
22. Failure to report a forgery promptly is one of the types of customer negligence dis-
cussed in this Article, at least where there are subsequent forgeries by the same wrongdoer.
U.C.C. § 4-406(c) (1989) (amended 1990) (bank statement rule). Other defenses exist, such as
when the customer through some act ratifies the forgery, id. § 3-404(2) & cmt. 3 (superseded
by § 3-403(a) & cmt. 3 (1990)). Additionally, the payor bank can assert the statute of limita-
tions as a defense to the customer's demand to recredit. Id. § 4-406(4) (superseded by § 4-
406(f)(1990)). The customer has one year to "discover and report his [or her] unauthorized
signature." Id. If the customer fails to do so within this time he or she will be precluded from
asserting the forgery against the bank. Id.
23. Id. § 3-406 (amended 1990) (customer "who by his [or her] negligence substantially
contributes to ... the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting [for-
gery]"). Id. Signatures are presumed to be genuine unless specifically denied in the pleadings,
"except where the action is to enforce the obligation of a purported signer who has died or
become incompetent before proof is required." Id § 3-307(l)(b) (superseded by § 3-308(a)
(1990)).
24. Proximate cause tests such as the "but-for" test, the "substantial factor" test, and the
"causation in fact" test are all commonly used in the law of negligence. See, eg., Doupnik v.
General Motors Corp., 225 Cal. App. 3d 849, 857, 275 Cal. Rptr. 715, 719 (1990) (applying
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requires inquiry into a customer's duty of care is also unclear.25
Courts have found the customer's conduct sufficiently negligent to
trigger the contributory negligence preclusion where the customer
(1) failed to look after a signature stamp;2 6 (2) failed to exercise reason-
able care in hiring and supervising employees who handled checks; 27 and
(3) failed to take reasonable action after discovering an irregularity with
respect to a first forged check.28 This preclusion allows the payor bank
to avoid recrediting the customer's account, thus placing the entire
amount of the forged check loss upon the negligent customer.29
"substantial factor" test); People v. Pike, 197 Cal. App. 3d 732, 744, 243 Cal. Rptr. 54, 62-63
(1988) (applying "but-for" test); Maupin v. Widling, 192 Cal. App. 3d 568, 573, 237 Cal. Rptr.
521, 524 (1987) (explaining "causation in fact" test); see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-42, at 263-79 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROS-
SER & KEETON].
25. Compare Thompson Maple Prods., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 234 A.2d 32 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1967) (negligence in allowing access to blank delivery slips and issuance of instru-
ments substantially contributed to forgery) with Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1974) (negligence in issuance of checks did not substan-
tially contribute to forgery). For a discussion of inadequacies in the Code's treatment of this
concept, see Douglas J. Whaley, Negligence and Negotiable Instruments, 53 N.C. L. REv. 1
(1974). Professor Whaley discusses the difficulties inherent in the application of negligence
principles to negotiable instruments law, particularly in questions of causation. Id. at 22-29.
He concludes that courts should substitute a cause-in-fact test for the legal or proximate cause
test. Id. at 26, 42. For a discussion of how the RUCC fails to adequately resolve this confu-
sion, see infra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
26. The Code drafters explain that "[t]he most obvious case is that of the drawer who
makes use of a signature stamp or other automatic signing device and is negligent in looking
after it. The section extends, however, to cases where the party has notice that forgeries of his
signature have occurred and is negligent in failing to prevent further forgeries by the same
person." U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 7 (1989) (amended 1990); see First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Christian
Found. Life Ins. Co., 420 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Ark. 1967) (failure to adequately supervise use of
facsimile signature). See generally Whaley, supra note 25, at 33-34 (obviously negligent to
keep signature stamp or other automatic device without proper safeguarding to prevent unau-
thorized use).
27. See Whaley, supra note 25, at 35-38. Professor Whaley states: "No court ... should
hold that an employer may hire a paroled ex-forger, place him in charge of check disburse-
ments, and fail to supervise his activities." Id. at 36.
The employer's duty to question its employees varies with the circumstances. For exam-
ple, suspicious circumstances will increase the employer's duty, including where there are
missing records, as in Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Lodge, 325 A.2d 222 (Conn. 1973), or the
employee is unexplainedly living beyond his means, as in Scott v. First National Bank, 119
S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1938). In such cases, the employer would be negligent to ignore the possibil-
ity of employee forgery.
28. Vending Chattanooga, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d 624, 627
(Tenn. 1987); Kaley v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 775 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1988); see U.C.C. § 4-406 (1989) (amended 1990). See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT
S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 16-7, at 712-15 (3d ed. 1988) (customer is con-
tributorily negligent when put on notice of forgery by irregularities in account).
29. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989) (amended 1990); id. § 3-307(1) (superseded by § 3-308(a)
(1990)).
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Section 3-406 of the Code, however, only grants the customer negli-
gence preclusion to a payor bank who paid the instrument "in good faith
and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the
drawee's or payor's business."' 30 The section thus places the entire
amount of the forged check loss upon the payor bank when both the
customer and the payor bank are negligent. However, except for section
4-103(3),31 the Code offers no guidance in determining whether the con-
duct of the payor bank falls below the standard of ordinary care.
Although courts are divided on this issue, many courts and commenta-
tors interpret the Code as requiring payor banks to compare the drawer's
signature on an item with the customer's signature on file before paying
an item and charging its customer's account.32
30. Section 3-406 of the Code states:
Any person who by his [or her] negligence substantially contributes to a material
alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is pre-
cluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority against a holder in due
course or against a drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in good faith and
in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's
business.
Id. § 3-406 (amended 1990).
In a similar manner, § 4-406 provides that the preclusion is inapplicable if the "customer
establishes lack of ordinary care on the part of the [payor] bank in paying the item(s)." Id.
§ 4-406(3) (subsection withdrawn 1990). The dilatory customer was precluded from asserting
forgery with respect to subsequent forgeries by the same wrongdoer. Id. § 4-406(2)(b). See
infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the bank statement duty.
31. Under § 4-103(3), following Federal Reserve regulations, operating letters, clearing
house rules and "general banking usage" is evidence of the exercise of ordinary care. U.C.C.
§ 4-103(3) (1989) (amended 1990). Pursuant to these provisions payor banks must establish
and observe certain routine practices before paying an item.
32. See, e.g., Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank, 527 N.E.2d 354 (InI.
App. Ct. 1988) (although examination of signature cards may not be practical commercial
practice, nevertheless bank not relieved from bearing loss from paying forged checks); First
Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Cutright, 205 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Neb. 1973) (bank failing to compare
rubber stamped signature on check with pen signature on signature card was enough evidence
to show lack of ordinary care); Mortimer Agency, Inc. v. Underwriters Trust Co., 341
N.Y.S.2d 75, 78 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (considering signature together with suspicious nature of spell-
ing amount and accompanying letter); Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329
(Or. Ct. App. 1984) (automated check processing without comparing of signatures of checks
below certain amount did not reasonably relate to detection of unauthorized signatures); Fed-
eral Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 580 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1986) (bank cannot assert contributory negligence of customer as defense where bank has
failed to compare cheek's signature to signature card of customer); Jackson v. First Nat'l
Bank, 403 S.W.2d 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966) (bank is negligent for automatically processing
checks without verifying signature where circumstances should have put bank on notice of
forgery); Whaley, supra note 25, at 15-17. But see Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v.
Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1988) (bank's practice of examining all signatures on
checks for more than $1000, examining signatures on checks between $100 and $1000 if bank
had reason to suspect problem, and examining randomly chosen one percent of all other
checks is one of ordinary care and standard commercial banking practices); Vending Chatta-
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2. Bank statement duty
Section 4-406 of the Code imposes another duty upon the payor
bank's customer, to "exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine
the statement and items to discover his [or her] unauthorized signature
... and [to] notify the bank promptly after discovery thereof."33 If the
customer fails to fulfill this duty, the customer may be precluded from
asserting the forgery under certain circumstances. 34 Where these cir-
cumstances exist, the customer will bear the entire loss because the bank
statement rule gives the payor bank another complete defense to the cus-
tomer's recredit claim. As with customer negligence, if the customer can
establish lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item,
the entire amount of the loss reverts back to the bank.3"
3. Impact of payor bank's defenses
The UCC, as currently codified in the majority of states, requires the
payor bank to assert any defense that it might have against the cus-
tomer 6 if it wishes to proceed against collecting banks on a forgery
claim.37 This provision coupled with the lack of other alternatives38
nooga, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d 624 (Tenn. 1987) (bank not
required as matter of law to closely examine each check with signature card but must conform
to reasonable commercial standards).
33. U.C.C. § 4-406(1) (1989) (amended 1990). This is the so-called bank statement duty.
34. The customer will be precluded from asserting the forgery, first, where the bank suffers
a loss as a result of the customer's failure. Id § 4-406(2)(a) (amended 1990). Second, the
customer will be precluded from asserting the forgery with respect to subsequent forgeries by
the same wrongdoer. Id. § 4-406(2)(b) (amended 1990).
35. Id. § 4-406(3) (amended 1990).
36. Such defenses would be asserted against the customer's claim to recredit the account.
In addition to customer negligence, the payor bank might be able to assert the statute of limita-
tions as a defense to the demand for recredit. This statute of limitations operates without
regard to the negligence of either party. Id § 4-406(4) (superseded by § 4-406(0 (1990)). In
other words, while ordinarily the bank's negligence will excuse the negligence of the customer,
the bank's negligence will not excuse or toll the running of the statute. Under these circum-
stances the customer probably will be precluded from proceeding against collecting banks and
other prior good faith transferors. The customer will presumably still have a valid cause of
action against the forger, at least until the corollary state statute of limitations expires.
37. Subsection 5 of section 4-406 states:
If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense against a claim of a cus-
tomer upon or resulting from payment of an item and waives or fails upon request to
assert the defense the bank may not assert against any collecting bank or other prior
party presenting or transferring the item a claim based upon the unauthorized signa-
ture or alteration giving rise to the customer's claim.
Id. § 4-406(5) (1989) (subsection withdrawn 1990).
38. If the payor bank has paid the item and has been forced to recredit its customer's
account, it will generally be unsuccessful in shifting this loss to prior collecting banks. The
doctrine of Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762), as codified in the final payment
provisions of U.C.C. §§ 3-418, 4-213 (1989) (superseded by § 4-215 (1990) and § 4-302 (1989)
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causes the payor bank routinely to assert customer negligence as a de-
fense.39 The frequency with which payor banks assert customer negli-
gence may cause the customer, rather than the payor bank, to bear the
loss from the forgery because many customers cannot afford to litigate
the issue of negligence.' This is, of course, more likely where the
amount of the forged item is small because it is not cost effective for the
customer to litigate the question of negligence in such cases. Thus, the
customer, even when not negligent, often bears the loss on small items.
Where the amount of the forged item is large, on the other hand, it be-
(amended 1990)), is the major obstacle to the payor bank's attempt to recover "up the chain."
The payor bank will be unable to shift the loss using UCC warranty theory because, except for
the rare instance where the presenter actually knows that the drawer's signature is forged, no
presentment warranty will be breached. Dozier v. First Alabama Bank, 363 So. 2d 781, 784
(Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (presenter warrants under subsection (1)(b) of each warranty that he or
she has no knowledge of forged drawer's signature); Payroll Check Cashing v. New Palestine
Bank, 401 N.E.2d 752, 754, 756 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (warranty of good title breached only by
forged indorsement, not by forged drawer's signature); Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v.
County Trust Region, 398 N.Y.S.2d 298, 298 (App. Div. 1977); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v.
Hammond, 260 S.E.2d 617, 621 (N.C. 1979) (payor bank cannot assert breach of transfer
warranty under subsection (2) of each warranty provision because the payor is not transferee).
The payor bank will be similarly unsuccessful if it bases its action upon the Article 3
indorser's contract under 3-414(1). See, e.g., Dozier, 363 So. 2d at 783; Kirby v. First &
Merchants Nat'l Bank, 168 S.E.2d 273, 276 (Va. 1969). The payor bank may also attempt to
sue for common law restitution under § 1-103 of the Code. That section provides for the use of
principles of law and equity to supplement the UCC, unless displaced by the act. U.C.C. § 1-
103 (1989). The payor's right to restitution is, however, limited by UCC § 3-418 which pro-
vides that payment is final in favor of a holder in due course. Id. § 3-418; id. § 3-418 (1990).
The extent to which these rights are limited by the accountability provisions of the Code is also
open to question. Id. § 4-213 (1989) (superseded by § 4-215 (1990)); id. § 4-302 (amended
1990); see, e.g., Dow & Ellis, supra note 15, at 808-23 (conflict between sections cannot be
reconciled); Columbo, supra note 19, at 831-32 (commentators split as to whether banks are
prohibited from recovering funds paid out).
39. This assertion is based mainly on the paucity of cases in which the payor bank did not
assert customer negligence as a defense. Of course, to some extent this may be attributable to
the willingness of banks to voluntarily recredit their customers' accounts upon being notified of
a forgery. Daniel E. Murray, Price v. Neal in the Electronic Age: An Empirical Survey, 87
BANK. L.J. 686, 702-03 (1970). As the amount of the forgery (and thus the loss to the payor
bank) increases, however, the bank undoubtedly becomes less willing to voluntarily recredit its
customer's account.
According to the findings of Professor Murray, it also is not unusual for the payor bank
simply to recredit its customer's account, either absorbing the loss or collecting under its for-
gery insurance policy. Id. at 701-05, 713-15.
40. In an earlier revision project, entitled the Uniform New Payments Code (NPC), the
drafters made this point in support of their proposed two-tier loss allocation scheme. See
UNIFORM NEW PAYMENTS CODE § 200 purpose cmt. 2 (P.E.B. Draft No. 3, 1983). See infra
notes 94-96 and accompanying text, where a similar two-tier scheme is proposed. For back-
ground on the NPC, see Steven B. Dow & Nan S. Ellis, The Proposed Uniform New Payments
Code: Allocation of Losses Resulting From Forged Drawers' Signatures, 22 HARV. . ON LEGIS.
399 (1985); Hal S. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83
COLUM. L. Rnv. 1664 (1983).
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comes more cost effective to litigate the question of negligence. There-
fore, with large items it is more likely that the customer will litigate and
avoid bearing the loss.
III. ALLOCATION OF LossEs UNDER THE RUCC
The RUCC revisions substantially alter the UCC's basic loss alloca-
tion scheme. Although the revisions are presumably intended to improve
the Code, they contain significant inequities in allocating forged check
losses. Although nine states have adopted the RUCC,41 states currently
considering adopting the revisions42 and states that have yet to address
the changes should consider these inequitable results before adopting the
RUCC.
A. Proposed Changes Under the Revised Article 3
Superficially, revised Article 3 retains the Code's basic loss alloca-
tion scheme between payor banks and their customers by keeping the
concept of "properly payable" and the relationship between the concepts
of properly payable and customer negligence.43 Thus, in the case of
check forgery, the customer can still demand that his or her account be
recredited for the amount of the forged check.' Furthermore, the bank
is still able to assert the usual defenses to this demand, including cus-
tomer negligence, because the revisions retain the basic rule that cus-
tomer negligence which "substantially contributes" to the forgery
precludes the customer from successfully demanding recredit.45
There are, however, several important changes in the revised Article
3 which, when combined, significantly shift the allocation of forgery
losses from the payor bank to its customer.46 First, where present law
completely excuses the customer's negligence if the payor bank is also
negligent,4 7 section 3-406 of the revisions calls for the loss to be allocated
using a comparative negligence scheme.48 Thus, if both the customer
41. See supra note 6.
42. Ia
43. U.C.C. § 4-401 (1990). The only major change in § 4-401 is in subsection (c). This
subsection permits the bank to charge its customer's account for postdated checks unless the
customer has notified the bank of such check prior to its presentment. Id. § 4-401(c).
44. See id. § 4-401 cmt. 1.
45. U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1990) (customer "whose failure to exercise ordinary care substan-
tially contributes to... the making of a forged signature" is precluded from asserting forgery).
Compare id. § 3-406 (1989) (amended 1990) with id. § 3-406 (1990).
46. See infra notes 57-93 and accompanying text.
47. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989) (amended 1990); see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
48. U.C.C. § 3-406(b) (1990).
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and the payor bank have failed to exercise ordinary care, the loss is di-
vided between them "according to the extent to which the failure of each
to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss."'49
The second change governing loss allocation is contained in section
4-406.5o Although this section continues to provide that failure to ex-
amine a bank statement and to promptly report any forgeries constitutes
customer negligence and remains a defense to a customer's claim to
recredit his or her account,51 this duty arises whether or not the items
were actually returned to the customer.52 To accommodate the increas-
ing use of check truncation,53 the revisions require only that the bank
send or make available a statement of account, and do not require the
bank to return the items to the customer unless the customer requests
them.54 In addition, section 4-406 provides for a comparative negligence
scheme similar to that proposed in section 3-406.
5
The third, and perhaps most significant change provides that the
failure of the payor bank to examine computer processed items for forged
signatures will not constitute bank negligence per se if the bank's proce-
dures do not require examining the items, and if the bank's procedures
are not unreasonable in comparison with those of other banks.5 6 This
49. Id.
50. Id. § 4-406.
51. Compare id § 4-406 (1989) (amended 1990) with id § 4-406 (1990).
52. Section 4-406 of the RUCC states in pertinent part: "A bank that sends or makes
available to a customer a statement of account showing payment of items for the account shall
either return [the items] or provide information in the statement of account sufficient to allow
the customer reasonably to identify the items paid." Id § 4-406(a) (1990). Furthermore, the
official comment states: "Whether the bank returns to the customer the items paid is a matter
for bank-customer agreements." Id. § 4-406 cmt. 1. The bank can comply with the general
standard of providing information "sufficient to allow the customer reasonably to identify the
items paid" in three ways. First, it can provide the item. Id. Second, it can provide the
customer with an image of the item. Id. Finally, it can describe the item by item number,
amount and date of payment. Id.
53. Check truncation refers to the process of check collection whereby items are not physi-
cally returned to the payor from the collecting bank. See DONALD I. BAKER & ROLAND E.
BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSMMS § 2.02, at 2-13 to 2-30
(1988) (explanation of various forms of check truncation).
54. U.C.C. § 4-406(b) (1990). Where the items are not returned, the bank retaining the
item (depositary or payor) would be required to "maintain the capacity to furnish legible cop-
ies of the items" for seven years. Id.
55. Id. § 4-406(d)-(e). Under revised § 4-406, however, if the customer proves that the
bank did not pay the item in good faith, the comparative negligence rule would be inapplicable
and the customer would be permitted to assert the forgery. Id. § 4-406(e). Curiously, a simi-
lar provision is not found in § 3-406. Id. § 3-406.
56. Section 3-103(a)(7) of the RUCC provides:
"Ordinary care" in the case of a person engaged in business means observance of
reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which the person is lo-
cated, with respect to the business in which the person is engaged. In the case of a
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standard would, in effect, relieve payor banks of any duty to examine
items for forgery.
B. Analysis of R UCC Loss Allocation
The proposed changes are flawed in several significant respects, and
should not be adopted. First, the RUCC retains the basic customer neg-
ligence terminology of the Code, passing up an excellent opportunity to
resolve the confusion that exists with respect to the present wording.
Second, the RUCC effectively relieves the payor bank of any duty to
examine items for forgery. Inasmuch as failure to examine items for for-
gery is virtually the only way in which a payor bank can be negligent in
this context, the negligent customer will bear the loss much more fre-
quently under the RUCC than under the Code. As a result, it is more
likely under the RUCC than under the Code that both negligent and
non-negligent customers will choose to bear the loss rather than to liti-
gate the question of negligence, even in the case of large items. Third,
adopting a system of comparative negligence creates a further disincen-
tive for the customer to litigate the negligence question. Taken as a
whole, these proposed changes substantially shift loss allocation from the
payor bank to the customer. The magnitude of this shift is only apparent
through a closer examination of each individual change.
1. Negligence
The revisions retain the common negligence terminology,5 7 thereby
prolonging the confusion surrounding it." In an apparent effort to elimi-
nate this uncertainty, the revision to section 3-406 substitutes the phrase
"failure to exercise ordinary care" for the term "negligence." The term
"negligence," however, was never problematic. The issues of proximate
causation and the applicable standard of conduct are the source of
problems. 9 Thus, merely modifying the verbiage without addressing
these issues offers no significant improvement.6'
bank that takes an instrument.., by automated means, reasonable commercial stan-
dards do not require the bank to examine the instrument if the failure to examine
does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures and the bank's procedures do not
vary unreasonably from general banking usage.
Id. § 3-103(a)(7).
57. Compare iaJ § 3-406 (1989) (amended 1990) with id § 3-406 (1990).
58. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 24, at 263-80; Whaley, supra note 25, at 26-29;
infra notes 63, 66, 69 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 66, 69-70 and accompanying text.
60. Furthermore, UCC § 4-406 used the phrase "lack of ordinary care" even before the
1990 amendments. Compare U.C.C. § 4-406(3) (1989) (amended 1990) with id. § 4-406(3)
(1990). This change, therefore, is not significant.
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The definition of "ordinary care" in the revised section 3-103(a)(7),
however, is significant. In the case of a person engaged in business, ordi-
nary care is defined as "observance of reasonable commercial standards,
prevailing in the area in which that person is located, with respect to the
business in which that person is engaged."'" The definition, however,
only addresses the standards of care for the bank and the business cus-
tomer; it does not outline the non-business customer's standard of care.
In addition, the revisions provide no guidance as to what particular
conduct might constitute a failure to exercise ordinary care in the bank-
ing context.62 This issue has been the source of conflict in the courts
under present law6" and should, therefore, have been addressed. Fur-
thermore, the fact that proposed section 3-103 of the RUCC effectively
relieves the bank from the responsibility of examining items for forgeries
or other wrongdoing merely compounds the confusion. As a result it is
unclear what type of conduct on the part of the payor might constitute
lack of ordinary care."
The revisions also fail in two significant ways to resolve causation
problems. First, a comment to the RUCC provides that conduct "sub-
stantially contributes" to the loss if it is "a contributing cause of the al-
teration or [forged] signature and a substantial factor in bringing it
about."6 Assuming the drafters proposed this definition as a response to
the confusion under the UCC,66 they should have provided a statutory
definition rather than relegating the language to the comments.
Second, the drafters adopted the "substantial factor" test from tort
law and rejected the more stringent "direct and proximate cause" test67
in order to make it easier for the bank to avoid recrediting the customer's
61. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990).
62. The drafters of the RUCC expressly refused to define the particular conduct that
would constitute failure to exercise ordinary care. "The question is [instead] left to the court
or the jury for decision in the light of the circumstances in the particular case including reason-
able commercial standards that may apply." Hd § 3-406 cmt. 1 (1990).
63. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(noting significant authority split on standard of care required for examining checks for forger-
ies); see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
64. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990). See infra note 84 and accompanying text where it is
suggested that failure to examine items is virtually the only example of payor bank conduct
that could constitute bank negligence.
65. U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 2 (1990).
66. See generally Whaley, supra note 25, at 2-3 ("negligent issuance of checks not 'proxi-
mate cause' of loss; only negligence leading to forgery is compensable and UCC § 3-406 has no
effect on this rule").
67. U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 2 (1990).
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account.6" It is unclear, however, that this would be the actual effect,
given the substantial amount of controversy that the concept of proxi-
mate cause and its related questions generate under tort law.69 Rather, it
is more likely that incorporating the "substantial factor" test from tort
law into commercial law will merely invite more controversy. 70 More-
over, with a less stringent test the revisions will likely make it easier for
the bank to prove customer negligence, thereby shifting the loss from the
payor bank to the customer.
71
2. Bank examination of items
The revisions make fundamental changes to the payor bank's duty
to examine items for forgery.72 Although the payor bank would continue
to be negligent if it failed to follow reasonable commercial standards,
73
revised Article 3 specifies that those reasonable commercial standards do
not necessarily require the payor bank to examine any item automatically
processed for payment.7' Under the RUCC, if the item is automatically
processed, the loss from any forged drawer's signature will likely remain
68. Id. ("Under the less stringent test the preclusion [of the assertion of a forgery as the
basis for recrediting an account] should be easier to establish.").
69. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 24, at 263 ("There is perhaps nothing in the
entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in
such a welter of confusion."); Whaley, supra note 25, at 42 ("In negotiable instruments law as
elsewhere, 'proximate cause' has become a wild card doctrine and caused enormous confusion
in an area where ... certainty is a commercial necessity.").
70. See Whaley, supra note 25, at 27, 42. Professor Whaley argues that the proximate
cause test should be abandoned in favor of an approach questioning whether there existed a
duty to do or not to do the act, whether the duty was violated, and whether this violation was a
substantial factor contributing to the forgery. Id. at 26-27. Professor Whaley asserts that in
deciding whether or not a duty existed:
[Tihe court must take into account many policy factors such as the degree of com-
mercial awareness of the party, the financial impact of an adverse decision, the fore-
seeability of the harm, the ability of later parties to protect themselves from the
wrongdoer, the degree of fault, and, perhaps most important, the extent to which the
party's actions are out of step with those of others in similar situations.
Id. at 27.
71. This is especially true in light of the fact that it will be more difficult for the customer
to prove payor bank negligence under the revisions. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76-93 and accompanying text where it is suggested that the proposed shift of
loss away from the payor bank to the customer is inappropriate.
72. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990).
73. Id. §§ 3-406(b), 4-406(e). Under the revisions this negligence on the part of the payor
would partially offset the negligence of the customer. Id.
74. Id § 3-103(a)(7). The NPC had a provision suggesting that failure of the payor bank
to examine its customer's signature on items under a certain amount might meet reasonable
commercial standards. UNIFORM NEW PAYMEmS CODE § 202 purpose cmt. 4 (P.E.B. Draft
No. 3, 1983). See supra note 40 for a discussion of the NPC. By comparison, under the
RUCC the payor bank would have no obligation to examine any items, even large items.
U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990).
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on a negligent customer--even if the payor bank failed to examine the
signature. While there is currently some disagreement among jurisdic-
tions which follow the UCC, this result is generally not possible under
the UCC.
75
The RUCC advocates relieving the bank of its duty to inspect for
forgeries in part to encourage check truncation and to accommodate the
realities of computer check processing.71 The apparent rationale for this
position rests in the impracticality of payor banks checking the validity
of all signatures. 7
This justification, however, is flawed for several reasons. First, sig-
nature verification is compatible with efficient check processing. Some
empirical evidence indicates that the majority of payor banks check the
drawers' signature on a substantial number of checks. 78 Even banks that
75. See Whaley, supra note 25, at 15; supra note 32. The RUCC approach is arguably
contrary to the common law approach. Professor Whaley submits that the basis for many
commercial law negligence cases is the question of the ability of later parties to protect them-
selves from the negligent party's conduct. See Whaley, supra note 25, at 10. Under this "sec-
ond chance theory," the payor bank would have the ability, by examining items for forgeries,
to protect itself from the earlier negligent conduct of the customer. If it chooses not to do so, it
would not be able to pass the loss back to the earlier negligent party. Id.
76. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(7), 4-101 cmt. 2 (1990). With the type of check truncation in
which the depositary bank retains the items, payor banks do not receive the items in any
physical form. See BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 53, § 2.02. The payor bank, therefore,
typically has no opportunity to verify its customer's signature. Such a system would appear to
be incompatible with a loss allocation scheme like that under the old UCC, which ultimately
depended on signature verification.
77. The drafters of the NPC advocated the abolition of the Price v. Neal doctrine by substi-
tuting the transmission liability doctrine which assigned liability to any party who transferred
an unauthorized item. UNIFORM NEw PAYMENTS CODE § 204 (P.E.B. Draft No. 3, 1983).
One rationale given for this proposal concerned the payor bank's inability to check the validity
of signatures after the development of computer check processing. Id. § 204 cmt. 2. Commen-
tators severely criticized the suggestion that the doctrine of Price v. Neal should be abolished
and the suggestion was discarded. See, e.g., Dow & Ellis, supra note 40, at 424-33. The NPC
proposed that because it is difficult for the payor bank to check the validity of its customers'
signatures, the bank should be permitted to shift the loss up the chain to the prior collecting
banks. UNIFORM NEW PAYMENTS CODE § 204 cmt. 2. The revisions propose that because it
is difficult for the payor bank to check the validity of its customers' signatures, the bank should
be permitted to shift the loss to its customers. This rationale is questionable, and shifting the
loss in this way is wholly inappropriate.
78. Murray, supra note 39, at 698-701. In his 1970 survey Professor Murray reports that
nearly all banks check most signatures. However, since 1970 there is evidence that contradicts
the basic findings of his research. AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL OPERA-
TIONs/AUToMATION SURVEY 119 (1986). There is additional compelling anecdotal evidence.
For example, Morgan Guaranty Trust had a policy of examining signatures only on checks of
$10,000 or more. Sally S. Harwood, Note, Commercial Transactions-Commercial Paper-
Allocation of Liability for Checks Bearing Unauthorized Indorsements and Unauthorized
Drawer's Signatures, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1090 n.90 (1978); see also John D. O'Malley,
Common Check Frauds and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 189, 209
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no longer check signatures on all items typically check them on large
items-items over some dollar amount established by the banks. 9 Such
verification is both practical and cost effective because there are relatively
few large-item checks presented to payor banks and because the potential
losses are high. The revisions, however, do not account for this
practice.80
Even if the economic realities of modem banking justify relieving
the payor bank of its duty to verify all signatures, they do not justify
relieving the payor bank of a duty to verify at least some signatures. It
seems reasonable, given the costs of verification and the certainty and
extent of liability, that verifying the customer's signature on items over a
certain amount would be economical for the payor bank.8 1 The RUCO,
however, does not obligate the payor bank to check signatures even on
large amount items."2 The risk of loss from forged drawers' signatures
should not be shifted away from the payor bank. Even if a shift in loss is
justified on an economic basis, the shift should only take place to the
extent that signature verification by the payor bank is not economical.83
(1969) (stating that "[i]t has been about 40 years since large banks have given up the precau-
tionary practice of examining the signatures on each check paid."). Oak Park Trust & Savings
Bank examined only checks greater than $1000. Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say.
Bank, 527 N.E.2d 354, 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), rev'd, 522 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. 1990) (bank's
machine automatically separated and paid all checks under $1000). Similarly, Western Bank
has a policy of examining signatures only on checks of $5000 or more. Medford Irrigation
Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329, 331 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (bank asserted procedure consis-
tent with methods used by most banks of its size). Moreover, in view of the very large number
of items processed each day by some large banks it is difficult to believe that most banks
routinely verify the signatures on all items. Corinne Cooper, Checks Held Hostage-The
Funds Availability Controversy, 102 BANK. L.J. 532, 535 (1985) (approximately 36 billion
checks are collected through Federal Reserve system each year).
79. Wilder Binding Co., 527 N.E.2d at 355-56; Medford, 676 P.2d at 331; AMERICAN
BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 78, at 119 (1986).
80. U.C.C. § 3-103 (a)(7) (1990).
81. Computer systems are well suited to selecting items over a certain amount. These
items can then be visually inspected for forgery. An operator at the depository bank encodes
the amount of the check on its face using magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) symbols.
A computer at the payor bank then reads these symbols and can be programmed to pick out all
items over a certain amount. BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 53, § 1.02[2]; CLARK, supra
note 19, § 10.5. This practice is currently utilized by some banks. Murray, supra note 39, at
698-701.
82. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990).
83. See infra notes 94-105 where the authors propose a two-tier scheme under which the
payor bank is obligated to examine signatures on items over $500. Seventy-two percent of all
checks written are for under $100. BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, CHECKING Ac-
COUNT USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1979). Only 28%, therefore, are for over $100, and
even fewer are for over $500. Since a majority of payor banks check the drawer's signature on
a substantial number of checks, they presumably find it economical to do so. See supra note
78. It is clearly economical, then, for banks to verify signatures on items over $500.
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Second, banks have voluntarily chosen to process their checks by
computer. It is fair to assume that banks see this method as the most
efficient and cost-effective way of processing checks under the UCC, and
they undoubtedly made the choice with full consideration of the forgery
costs they were likely to incur. If the ultimate forgery costs make com-
puter check processing less cost-effective than the payor banks had antic-
ipated, the banks are free to develop an alternative processing method
which meets their needs for efficiency and signature verification.
Third, a rule which no longer requires payor banks to inspect items
for forgeries would effectively relieve the payor bank of all forgery losses
because, in the usual case, the only fault a payor bank ever incurs arises
from its failure to examine an item.
84
Finally, to the extent that this change may be justified by a desire to
encourage the increased use of check truncation, the justification is inad-
equate. Check truncation developed under the present loss allocation
system in spite of the concern of payor banks over forgery liability. 5
Any argument that computer processing and check truncation cannot
develop without changes in the rules of loss allocation is implausible
because both of these methods have developed, and continued to develop,
under the current Code. It is fair to conclude that banks which use
check truncation believe it to be cost-effective under the Code.8 6 In fact,
many banks are currently attempting to minimize forgeries by developing
the technological means to verify and transmit signatures
electronically."
Advocates of check truncation suggest the practice as a cost reduc-
tion method for banks.88 Such cost reductions, however, do not justify
84. Other types of fault might conceivably include if the bank examined the check but
failed to discover the forgery, or if the bank was given some false signature cards and did not
verify them.
85. A 1981 study found that approximately 25% of all financial institutions truncate
checking services. Robert M. Garsson, Truncation Losing Ground as Banks Concentrate on
Other Matters, AM. BANKER, June 1, 1983, at 8; see also BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 53,
§§ 2.01-2.03 (truncation eliminates paper checks in favor of electronically transmitting data);
Linda McCormick, European American Will Soon Test Fast Check Processing Systen; 'Digi-
tized Image' Reduces Size of Paper by Three-Fourths; Allowing High-Speed Handling, AM.
BANKER, June 3, 1982, at 3.
86. Jerry McElhatton, Check Processing: The Challenge Grows, MAG. BANK ADMIn.,
June 1986, at 22, 28 (check truncation will contribute toward greater efficiency and less paper).
87. See McCormick, supra note 85, at 3. It is currently technologically possible for depos-
itary banks to retain checks and to forward a digital "image" of the check to the payor bank in
such a way that the payor bank can examine the drawer's signature without possessing the
actual item. Raymond F. Dinan, et al., ImagePlus High Performance Transaction System, 29
I.B.M. Sys. J. 421, 422, 432 (1990).
88. See McCormick, supra note 85, at 3.
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allowing check truncation to form the basis for loss allocations resulting
from forgeries. If the savings derived from check truncation are not sub-
stantial enough to overcome the expenses of the correspondingly larger
forgery costs, the practice does not make economic sense and should be
abandoned. Banks should, therefore, devise a method of processing
checks that is both economically sound and compatible with a loss allo-
cation scheme based upon sound public policy. State legislatures should
not adopt the RUCC because it would eliminate any incentive for banks
to devise such an equitable method.
3. Comparative negligence
The revision's comparative negligence scheme"9 will worsen the cus-
tomer's situation regardless of the amount of the forged item. On small
items, the customer will have even less incentive to litigate the question
of negligence because the bank's liability will be offset by the amount of
the customer's negligence. 9° Further, under the revisions the payor bank
ordinarily need not examine the drawer's signature;91 it then becomes
extremely difficult for the customer to establish the payor bank's negli-
gence on either small or large items. Thus, although this proportional
loss scheme appears to be fair in theory, in practice it will place the entire
loss on the customer.
In conclusion, the revisions to the UCC regarding loss allocation
from forged drawers' signatures are flawed, and states should not adopt
them as proposed. In their present form, they represent a major shift in
loss allocation from the payor bank to the customer. The shift is unjusti-
fied because the customer is unlikely to have forgery insurance,92 and less
likely to be able to avoid the loss. 93
89. U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-406 (1990).
90. Recall that under current law, the customer, even the non-negligent customer, will
frequently give up and absorb the loss because litigating the question of negligence is not cost
effective. UNIFORM NEW PAYMENTS CODE § 200 cmt. 2 (P.E.B. Draft No. 3, 1983); see supra
note 40 and accompanying text. This is true even though under present law the negligent
customer can shift the entire loss to the payor bank by showing payor bank negligence. Supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
91. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990).
92. For a general discussion of this rationale, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Insurance Against
Check Forgery, 60 COLuM. L. REv. 284, 294 (1960).
93. This argument is referred to as the "second chance" theory because the drawee bank
has some chance to detect the wrongdoing and avoid the loss, even after customer negligence.
It has been offered at common law to justify imposition of liability, despite customer negli-
gence, upon the payor bank that paid forged items. See Whaley, supra note 25, at 10.
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: TWO-TIER Loss ALLOCATION
A two-tier system of liability, recognizing the economic realities of
litigating disputes over small amounts, would be a better approach than
either the UCC or the RUCC.94 Under this approach, if the amount of
the forged check is less than a specified amount, for example $500,11 the
customer would bear no loss regardless of negligence. The bank would
recredit the customer's account for the item amount even if that cus-
tomer's negligence contributed to the forgery. This strict liability rule for
smaller items would protect the customer from the need to litigate the
negligence issue because it is not cost effective to do so. Where the
amount exceeds the given statutory minimum, however, the customer's
negligence would become relevant. This two-tier system would allocate
losses from forgeries between customers and payor banks more fairly
than either the UCC or the RUCC.
96
Under the UCC, the payor bank often refuses to recredit a cus-
tomer's account, asserting customer negligence.97 When the amount of
the item is relatively small, even the non-negligent customer often ab-
sorbs the loss rather than litigating the negligence question because of the
high cost of litigation.98 The revisions provide even less incentive to liti-
gate because they lower the bank's standard of care, thus decreasing the
customer's chances of recovery. If under the present law in most states
(where failure on the part of the payor bank to examine items for forged
signatures constitutes bank negligence) customers rarely find it cost effi-
cient to litigate the question of negligence on small items, it will be even
94. This two-tier system was proposed by the drafters of the NPC. UNiFORM NEW PAY-
MENTS CODE § 200(2) (P.E.B. Draft No. 3, 1983); see Dow & Ellis, supra note 40, at 411-18
(authors approved of two-tier system of liability as proposed in NPC). Although the two-tier
system proposed in the NPC applied only to consumers, its rationale:
should also be applied to the business customer for whom the costs of litigating the
issue of negligence are just as great. For many businesses, especially small ones,
these costs [would be] just as burdensome as for consumers. What is not economical
for a consumer is, in this case, no more economical for a business customer.
Dow & Ellis, supra note 40, at 416.
95. This amount was chosen mainly because it was the amount chosen by the drafters of
the NPC and the amount seems reasonable. See supra note 83. See also supra note 81 for a
discussion of how banks can effectively verify checks over a certain amount.
96. The authors' approach is directly contrary to that advocated by Professors Cooter and
Rubin in their article. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation
for Consumer Payments, 66 TEx. L. Rnv. 63 (1987). Professors Cooter and Rubin assert that
the consumer should be strictly liable for forged checks up to a certain amount, with the bank
liable for the remainder. Id. at 128.
97. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
98. See Bryan D. Hull, Common Law Negligence and Check Fraud Loss Allocation: Has
Common Law Supplemented or Supplanted the U.C.C.?, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 605, 612 & n.62
(1990); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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less likely for the question of negligence to be litigated under the RUCC
provisions, where failure to examine such items on the part of the payor
bank does not necessarily constitute bank negligence.99
Moreover, the comparative negligence scheme further reduces the
likelihood of litigation; even where the customer proves the bank's negli-
gence, recovery may be reduced by any contributory negligence. The
proposed two-tier system, however, would relieve the customer of the
burden of litigating the issue of negligence where economically unfeasi-
ble. The payor bank would be able to recoup these small item losses
through forgery insurance.
By comparison, the question of negligence is worth litigating where
larger amounts are at stake. Accordingly, states considering this issue
should combine the basic UCC approach with the proportional loss allo-
cation scheme of the revision" for amounts over $500. The customer
should be able to claim the forged item was not properly payable and
demand recredit. On these large items, the payor bank should be able to
defend against the demand for recredit by proving customer negligence,
and the customer should be able to rebut this with a showing of payor
bank negligence. The payor bank, however, should not be relieved of the
burden of examining items for forged signatures, as the revisions clearly
propose. Such a rule would effectively relieve the payor bank from bear-
ing any loss because in all but the most unusual cases the only sort of
fault a payor would ever have is failing to examine an item. 101 It is rea-
sonable to impose a duty on the payor bank to check signatures on at
least large checks.102 The RUCC fails to provide adequate incentives for
the payor bank to be careful because it does not obligate the bank to
check signatures on any items, even large ones. 103
For large items, the comparative or proportional negligence rule
proposed by the revisions would be appropriate when both bank and cus-
tomer have some degree of responsibility for the loss. Where the item is
large and litigation more likely, it is inequitable to ignore the relative
degrees of fault when allocating loss."° Once the trier of fact has deter-
99. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990); supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
100. U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-406(d)-(e) (1990) (loss allocated according to extent to which fail-
ure of each party to exercise ordinary care contributed to loss).
101. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 83.
103. Some evidence shows that banks commonly check the signatures on certain large items
over a specified amount. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
104. Writing from a law and economics perspective, Professor Julian McDonnell labels as
"paternalistic" any effort by the courts to penalize payor banks for failing to visually examine
drawers' signatures on items before payment. Julian B. McDonnell, Bank Liability for
Fraudalent Checks: The Clash of the Utilitarian and Paternalist Creeds Under the Uniform
[Vol. 25:57
FORGED DRAWERS' SIGNATURES
mined that both parties are at fault, apportioning the fault follows rela-
tively easily.
10 5
Finally, although the two-tier system of liability would protect even
the negligent customer from losses on small items, it would not en-
courage customer negligence. In any given act of forgery, there is a con-
siderable chance that the resulting loss will be over $500. Because the
customer cannot know whether any given forged item will be in an
amount greater than $500, the customer has a substantial incentive to be
careful with all checks.
V. CONCLUSION
While the present law governing loss allocation from forged draw-
ers' signatures needs improvement, the changes proposed in the revised
Article 3 fall considerably short of the mark. The combined effect of the
changes-the new negligence terminology, the comparative negligence
rule, and, most importantly, effectively relieving the payor bank of its
duty to examine signatures-shifts the loss onto the customer to an even
greater extent than under present law and will possibly increase overall
forgery losses.
This examination of the revised Article 3 reveals an underlying ef-
fort behind the proposed changes to shift the loss resulting from forged
drawers' signatures away from the payor bank. The Uniform New Pay-
ments Code (NPC) drafters undertook a similar effort more than a dec-
ade ago. 6 Under the NPC, the loss would have been shifted away from
the payor bank onto prior collecting banks.'0 v That approach was se-
verely criticized and eventually abandoned. 08 Now the new revisions
shift the loss ontQ the payor's customers. This approach is no more justi-
fied than the previously rejected NPC approach, and should not be
adopted.
Commercial Code, GEO. L.J. 1399, 1428-30 (1985). However, the suggested two-tier approach
would promote the efficiencies in check processing that Professor McDonnell desires, while
providing incentives to both banks and customers to prevent forgery losses. Any forgery losses
that do occur would be allocated on an equitable basis.
105. On large items, the policy behind proportional negligence outweighs the policies be-
hind the "second-chance theory." See supra note 75 for a discussion of the second-chance
theory. The parallel trend in tort law and the shift from contributory to comparative negli-
gence supports this position.
106. UNIFORM NEW PAYMENTS CODE § 204 (P.E.B. Draft No. 3, 1983). Preparation of
the Uniform New Payments Code began in 1977. Id. at 1-3.
107. Id. § 204 cmt. 3. ("Under subsection (1), all subsequent parties to which a draw order
is transmitted, including a payor account institution... can recover from prior parties if a
draw order is unauthorized.... This covers forged drawer signatures.").
108. Dow & Ellis, supra note 40.
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Promoting electronic processing of checks is a worthwhile goal.
The resulting cost savings will surely benefit banks and, if these savings
are passed on to check users, their customers as well. This goal, how-
ever, does not justify the revisions to Article 3. The banks developed and
implemented electronic processing and check truncation with the current
loss allocation scheme in place. This suggests that many bankers con-
sider these measures to be cost effective under present law. The RUCC
proposed changes will likely result in a more widespread use of these
electronic methods, but they will burden the customers with the entire
cost of forgeries. Current law, as codified by the majority of jurisdic-
tions, gives banks an incentive to verify their customer's signature on
items before paying them because the banks will generally bear the loss if
they pay items carrying forged drawers' signatures. It also creates an
incentive to develop new technologies to diminish forgery losses, such as
electronic signature verification that will remain compatible with elec-
tronic processing."° Under the RUCC these important incentives would
vanish.
Reducing litigation is also a worthwhile goal. The revisions will cer-
tainly have the effect of reducing litigation. Again, however, the bank's
customers will bear the entire cost because it is unlikely that even non-
negligent customers would litigate most cases of small forgery losses.
The goal of reducing litigation should not be achieved at the expense of
an equitable loss allocation scheme.
The two-tier proposal would promote electronic check processing
and would reduce the amount of potential litigation, while maintaining
incentives for both banks and their customers to prevent forgery. There-
fore, it would reduce the overall amount of forgery losses. Under the
two-tier scheme, banks would be able to use complete electronic process-
ing on an overwhelming majority of items. Banks would continue to
have an incentive to verify signatures and would likely continue to de-
velop new technologies to reduce forgery losses even further. Customers
would continue to have an incentive to be careful with their checks be-
cause of the chance that a forgery might exceed the statutory minimum.
The two-tier scheme would eliminate the need for litigation on
smaller items where it is not cost effective. In cases of larger items where
litigation is cost effective, the loss will be proportionately shared based on
the fault of both parties. The determination of fault would contemplate
the actual causes of forgeries: the payor bank's failure to examine signa-
tures as well as the customer's carelessness. State legislatures should not
109. See supra note 81 for a discussion of forgery and banks' use of computers.
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adopt the revised Article 3 unless the rules relating to loss allocation
from forged drawers' signatures are reconsidered and substantially
revised.
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